Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Non-Technical Summary
We analyze a family's term life insurance demand in a life cycle portfolio choice model. A major source of risk for a family is the early death of the sole wage earner. To hedge this, the family in our model can contract a term life insurance. Most existing papers studying the life insurance demand consider short term contracts that can be bought or sold continuously which ensures an optimal insurance holding at each point in time. This simplification might crucially affect the results. Therefore, we focus on a more realistic model for the insurance contract. The family can choose between different long-term contracts that differ with respect to their insurance sum. The annual insurance premium includes fees for administrative costs and transaction costs. A belated change of the insurance is costly for the family and only possible as long as the insured person is younger than a specific age and healthy. The wage earner faces stochastic mortality risk with a jump component that we interpret as critical illness. Once the agent suffers from a critical illness, the family cannot change the insurance contract any more, the income of the family reduces, and the mortality risk increases. If the wage earner dies before the maturity of the insurance contract, the remaining family members receive a single, fixed payment of the insurance company. We use a German life table to calibrate the mortality process, German cancer data to calibrate the critical illness shock and data of the German life insurance industry to calibrate the insurance fees. The insurance premiums are calculated such that the contracts are actuarially fair.
The realistically modeled insurance induces new qualitative effects that are important for the optimal decisions over the life cycle. The long-term insurance contract amplifies the effect of negative labor income shocks, since in the undesired case of a negative labor income shock a premature termination of the contract or a reduction of the insurance sum leads to additional losses. In an already bad state, the family has problems to make the premium payments. Families with a lower income volatility have a significantly higher insurance demand. The amplifying effect also reduces the insurance demand of families that are more risk averse. In general, the families increase insurance protection over the life cycle. The long term contract design effect fades away as agents get older, since the contract duration and human wealth uncertainty reduce. Most importantly, young families do not buy any term life insurance. If an older agent suddenly dies, the accumulated financial wealth and contracted insurance ensures that the surviving family member can maintain their consumption level, although consumption growth is reduced. By contrast, an unexpected death in younger years leads to severe problems for the family. To avoid lifetime poverty of the remaining family members, a social security could mitigate those problems by making transfer payments. Of course, a more welfare optimal solution should provide an incentive for families to insure themselves, especially early in life where the potential gap is the biggest. We find that a high level of income, a high labor income volatility, large fees imposed by insurance companies and the presence of health shocks reduce the insurance demand of a family. Our results suggest that a contract with a variable insurance sum which is linked to the actual labor income evolution (like in practice often done in occupational pensions) could avoid the negative amplifying effects of labor income shocks.
To summarize, we find that a realistically modeled insurance contract crucially affects the results in a life cycle portfolio choice model since new qualitative effects appear. Especially, the long-term nature of the contract amplifies the effects of negative income shocks which is bad for young families and should be accounted for by insurance companies.
Introduction
For most households, labor income is the essential source to finance lifetime consumption.
Therefore, a potential income loss following an early death of the wage earner is a crucial risk. Consequently, a life insurance is of special importance to hedge future consumption of the remaining family members. Following Richard (1975) most studies simplify the insurance decision by including an instantaneous term insurance contract. However, in practice buying life insurance usually involves a long-term commitment and later changes are costly. Furthermore, health checks prevent agents from contracting an insurance if they already have a critical illness. Therefore, we study a life cycle problem where a family has access to a realistic term life insurance that is solely available as a long-term contract which can only be bought or sold at certain lump-sum costs.
1
Another realistic feature of our model is that the family receives unspanned labor income earned by the head of the household. Since in practice agents cannot borrow against future income, we impose short-sale constraints that are binding, especially at young ages. In addition, we take a liquidity constraint into account so that the family's financial wealth has to stay non-negative at all points in time. Although papers studying life cycle problems without insurance decisions sometimes include unspanned labor income (see, e.g., Munk and Sørensen (2010) ), this issue is usually disregarded in papers including insurance decisions. Additionally, we add another layer of incompleteness. In our model, the wage earner faces the risk of suffering from a health shock that we interpret as critical illness. After a health shock the family has no access to the insurance market any more, i.e. cannot buy new insurance or change existing contracts. Furthermore, the wage earner's probability of dying increases significantly. We calibrate the health shock and mortality process to cancer and mortality data.
The combination of these realistic features (long-term insurance contracts, transaction costs, unspanned labor income, short-sale and liquidity constraints, health shocks) distinguishes our model from the related literature discussed in Section 2. This combination generates interesting qualitative effects that are important for the optimal decisions of the family over the life cycle:
1 Formally, we model the insurance decision as an impulse control problem.
The long-term nature of the insurance contract amplifies the effect of negative labor income shocks, since in the undesired case of a negative labor income shock a premature termination of the contract or a reduction of the insurance sum leads to additional losses. In an already bad state, the family might be worse off due to the stickiness of the insurance contract. Therefore, families with higher income uncertainty have significantly lower insurance demands. The amplifying effect also reduces the demands of families that are more risk averse and face labor income risk.
Most importantly, we find that younger families (head of household less than 30 years old) optimally stay away from life insurance markets and do not buy term life insurance at all.
Therefore, an unexpected death in younger years leads to severe problems for the family. Our finding is in line with the low participant rates that are observed empirically.
2 However, it differs significantly from the results in frameworks that model life insurance decisions via an instantaneous contract instead of a long-term contract as in our paper. In these frameworks, the theoretically optimal participation rates are typically much higher.
Furthermore, we find that it is optimal for families to increase insurance protection over the life cycle. This is because the long-term contract design becomes less relevant as agents get older, since the contract duration and the uncertainty about human wealth goes down. Therefore, if an older wage earner suddenly dies, the accumulated financial wealth and existing insurance contracts ensure that surviving family members can maintain their standard of living, although consumption growth must be reduced. To summarize, our results suggest that a high level of income, a high labor income volatility, large fees imposed by insurance companies and the presence of health shocks reduce the insurance demand of a family.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the related literature. Section 3 introduces the model setup. Section 4 presents the calibration.
Section 5 discusses our benchmark results. Section 6 provides robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
The modern portfolio optimization literature starts with Merton (1969) and Merton (1971) . In discrete time, Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) numerically solve a realistically calibrated life cycle model with deterministic mortality risk. One of their main objects is to study the effect of unspanned labor income that is calibrated to US data. Munk and Sørensen (2010) solve a realistically calibrated life cycle model in continuous time with unspanned labor income, but without mortality risk. Their main focus is on analyzing the effect of unspanned labor income and a stochastic riskfree rate on consumption-investment decisions. They adapt the labor income calibration results from Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) to a continuous-time framework and find that unspanned labor income significantly effects consumption-investment decisions. Merton (1975) points out the importance of the risk of dying as a source of risk. Campbell (1980) studies the corresponding optimization problem. He considers a two-period model and introduces an insurance market to allow a family to hedge the risk that the wage earner dies.
Analytically, he derives the optimal demand for insurance. Yaari (1965) analyzes the consumption decision of an agent when faced with longevity risk. Richard (1975) analytically solves a life cycle problem with deterministic labor income and a continuous instantaneous term insurance decision. He allows an uncertain time of death with deterministic distribution. Simple forms of an actuarially fair one-period life insurance contract are still widely used in the portfolio optimization literature. Pliska and Ye (2007) mathematically extend the model and analyze the effect of parameter choice on the life insurance demand. Closely related to our work is the paper Huang, Milevsky, and Wang (2008) , who also consider the consumption-investment and life-insurance decision of a family with CRRA utility. They focus on the correlation between labor income and asset returns. Their main results are that life-insurance demand is insensitive to changing risk aversion and highly depends on labor income volatility. As the previous literature, they also model life insurance via a short-term contract and do not consider health shocks or stochastic mortality risk.
Recent papers building on the work of Richard (1975) 
Model Setup
In this section, we present the model setup and describe the optimization problem of the family.
Financial Assets
The agent can invest into two financial assets, but faces short-sale constraints. The assets are a risky stock (index) S and a riskfree bond B. The riskfree rate is denoted by r. The dynamics are given by
with a constant market price of risk λ and stock market volatility σ S . The process W S = W S t is a standard Brownian motion.
Biometric Risk The sole wage earner faces the risk of a health shock (e.g. cancer) and of a death shock. The state variable A defined by Its dynamics are influenced by the health status and age of the wage earner and are given by Furthermore, p i,j is the fraction of income that remains after a jump from state i to state j. We assume that the agent retires at the prespecified date T R . The income process has a drift of µ Y , a volatility of σ Y and is correlated with the stock via ρ. Before retirement, the family's income is interpreted as labor income, whereas it is a pension after the retirement date. After the death of the wage earner, the income stream can be interpreted as widow's pension indexed by the salary upon death. If a critical illness shock occurs, the decreased income can be interpreted in the sense that the wage earner is forced to reduce work effort or increased medical expenses reduce the net income. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as a transfer income that the family receives from the government.
Insurance The family can buy a term life insurance to hedge the potential income loss resulting from the mortality risk of the wage earner. While the insurance contract is active, the insurance company pays the family a fixed payment I if the wage earner dies. The insurance offers a fixed set of contracts with specific payouts. The set of offered contracts is denoted by I = {0, 50 000, 100 000, 150 000, 200 000, 300 000, 500 000, 750 000, 1 000 000, 2 000 000}. (3.
2)
The family must pay a constant insurance premium ι(I) as long as the contract is active.
When the agent changes the insurance sum of the contract, a lump-sum payment η is due.
This payment takes the previous insurance sum, the new insurance sum and the age of the agent that determines the mortality pattern into account. The lump-sum payment ensures an actuarially fair new contract, but it also involves a fee. The contract can be changed as long as the wage earner is healthy and younger than T C . The insurance contract expires at min(τ D , T I ),
i.e. at the death of the insured person or at the maturity of the contract, T I . In the first case, the insurance pays the insurance sum I, in the second case the insurance pays nothing. We assume that T C < T I , i.e. after T I there is no insurance available any more.
Technically, the insurance decision can be characterized by an impulse control problem. The family chooses the intervention times ζ i , i ∈ N, and the intervention actions ω i , i ∈ N. The intervention can take place at time ζ i if the wage earner is alive (
and in the insurance market (ζ i ≤ T C ). A feasible intervention action requires that ω i is chosen such that the new insurance sum is in the set of offered contracts, I ζ i ∈ I. We denote the set of possible interventions at ζ i by
Formally, the above statement can be expressed by the condition ω i ∈ I ζ i . At an intervention time, the family must pay the lump-sum payment η(ζ i , ω i , I ζ i ) that is a correction payment which makes the insurance contract actuarially fair and involves a fee. A detailed description is postponed to Section 4, see equation (4.4). Following the intervention, the family pays the new yearly premium ι(I ζ i ) to maintain insurance protection until min(τ D , T I ).
Preferences The family has a fixed time horizon T and a power utility function given by
with relative risk aversion γ. Here φ A is a consumption scaling term that depends on the family size and for instance captures that two persons do not need twice as much consumption as a single person for the same utility level. 4 The family maximizes expected utility from intermediate consumption and terminal wealth given by
with time preference rate δ and financial wealth X. The constant ε specifies the importance of the bequest motive.
Financial Wealth Dynamics The family chooses consumption c and the fraction θ invested in the risky asset. As long as the wage earner is healthy and young, the family also optimizes the insurance sum decision via the impulse control strategy (ζ i , ω i ), i ∈ N. The wealth dynamics
Optimization Problem As stated above, the family optimizes expected utility from intermediate consumption and terminal wealth. The optimization problem is characterized by several state variables: financial wealth x, labor income y, the health status of the wage earner A and the current insurance choice I. The control variables are the consumption rate c, the proportion of wealth θ invested in risky assets, and the impulse control strategy for the insur-
At time t = 0 the wage earner is assumed to be 20 years old. The optimization problem is then given by
where we impose short-sale constraints, i.e. θ t ∈ [0, 1], and liquidity constraints, i.e. consumption has to be chosen in such a way that financial wealth stays positive, X t ≥ 0. The value function (indirect utility function) is defined by
We split the problem into its impulse control and stochastic control part. Given no intervention at t, but optimal impulse control afterwards, the value function is denoted by
In this case, the optimization problem reduces to a stochastic control problem. The corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB) is given by
with terminal condition J * (T, x, y, I, A) = ε
Note that in the case of ω i = 0 we have a continuation strategy, i.e. the family decides to keep its insurance decision. If this is optimal, then J(t, x, y, I, A) = J * (t, x, y, I, A). Consequently, there is no lump-sum payment, since we are in the no transaction region and η(ζ i , 0, I ζ i ) = 0.
Calibration
This section describes the model calibration that is also summarized in Table 1 .
[INSERT Biometric Risk Considering mortality risk, we use a Gompertz mortality model with constant parameters x, m, b for the healthy agent and increase the hazard rate of death by a constant term k 1 and an age-dependent term k 2 if the agent becomes unhealthy
We calibrate the health shock using German cancer data. 5 We weight the gender specific data equally and do not distinguish between genders in the simulation. This yields an overall lifetime risk of getting cancer of 46.75%, a median age at diagnosis of 69 years and an absolute 5-year survival rate of 53.5%. Furthermore, the data provides age and genderspecific cancer incidence rates for 5-year intervals up to an age of 85. We calibrate the health shock rate κ using a gender averaged version of the age specific cancer incidence rates. We assume the following functional form for the health shock rate
with constant parameters a, b, c. Since we do not have data for ages higher than 85, for simplicity we assume that cancer rates are constant for agents older than 85 years. We obtain the parametrization a = 0.02489, b = 66.96 and c = 29.42. Figure 1 illustrates the data points and our calibration of κ.
[
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
For the calibration of the magnitude of the impact of the cancer shock on the mortality intensity (k 1 , k 2 ) we use the absolute average 5-year survival probability. Since there is an age dependency, we split the effect in a constant part k 1 and an age dependent part k 2 . We calibrate k 1 and k 2 such that the simulated average 5-year survival probability and simulated death distribution match the empirical ones from the data. Here, we use German mortality data.
6
For the shock impact, the calibration yields k 1 = 0.048 and k 2 = 0.0008. Considering the Gompertz mortality risk parameters, we set the age at t = 0 to x = 20, the x-axis displacement to m = 89.45 and the growth rate (steepness parameter) to b = 6.5. Figure 2 compares our simulated yearly death rates with the empirical death rates in Germany.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Our simulation fits the above-mentioned empirical means well: The average time of death is 80.4, the average time of cancer detection is 69.0, and over the lifetime 47.4% of the population face a health shock. The median survival rate at cancer detection is 5 years. Figure 3 shows the histogram of health shocks and death shocks and the corresponding health-state distribution of the wage earner in our simulation.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
6 The German mortality data is taken from "Sterbetafel 2009/11, Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013".
Labor Income For the income dynamics (see equation (3.1)), we use the labor income calibration from Munk and Sørensen (2010) , which is a continuous-time version of the Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) results. They estimate the labor income process using PSID data dependent on the agent's education. Its drift term is modeled as
In the benchmark calibration, we assume that the wage earner has a high school education and set the corresponding parameters according to Munk and Sørensen (2010) . We use a retirement age of 65 (T R = 45), an age-and education-independent real wage increase of ξ 0 = 0.02 and an initial income of Y 0 = 19107. The drift polynomial is given by b = 0.1682, c = −0.00323, d = 0.000020 and the retirement income reduction parameter is P = 0.68212. We also assume a different volatility parameter before and after retirement
where we use σ w Y = 0.2 and σ r Y = 0 in the benchmark calibration. In the same manner, we fix the correlation parameter
Following Munk and Sørensen (2010), we assume zero correlation (ρ w = 0, ρ r = 0). If a jump occurs (critical illness or death), the income is reduced. In the critical illness case, we assume that the wage earner loses part of his income because he has to reduce his work effort. 7 We suppose that income decreases by 20%, i.e. p 1,2 (t < T R ) = 0.8. If the critical illness occurs during retirement, the pension is however unaffected, i.e. p 1,2 (t ≥ T R ) = 1. In both cases, the income volatility remains unchanged. In the benchmark calibration, we do not include a social security system which is studied as a robustness check (see Section 6). Hence, we set p 1,3 = p 2,3 = 0 such that the family has no income if the wage earner dies. Figure 4 depicts the income profile of the wage earner and of the family over the life cycle.
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Insurance We assume a competitive insurance market, which leads to an actuarially fair insurance. First, we consider the continuation case where no intervention takes place. Then, the family only has to pay the insurance premium. The yearly insurance premium ι(I) is assumed to be constant over time and is defined by the actuarial fairness criterion at t = 0 so that the expected discounted value of the insurance premia, Σ agent , is equal to the the expected discounted value of the payments of the insurance company to the family, Σ ins , i.e.
, and Σ ins (0, I) = E 0
where f D is the probability density function of τ D . The constant ψ ad captures yearly administrative costs and the constant ψ tr captures deferred acquisition costs that are paid with the yearly premium. Hence, the yearly insurance premium can be expressed as
Next, we consider the intervention case, i.e. a situation where the family increases or decreases the insurance sum I. If an intervention (ζ i , ω i ) takes place, the family must pay a lump-sum payment η(ζ i , ω i , I ζ i ). This payment is necessary since the insurance premium ι is calculated based on survival patterns at t = 0. Therefore, an insurance contract starting at ζ i > 0 requires an adjusted premium. If the family reduces protection, ω i < 0, no lump-sum payment is made.
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If the family increases insurance protection, ω i > 0, we assume that the insurance company takes previously paid premia into account so that the lump-sum payment is
where the two last terms depend on the previous insurance sum and capture the retrospective reserve. Note that they vanish in the special case where the family has no previous insurance protection. The variables Σ ins (ζ i , I ζ i ) and Σ agent (ζ i , I ζ i ) denote the conditional present values of the payments to the family and to the insurance company:
where we condition on the agent being in the insurance market, i.e. being healthy and alive.
The continuous premium ι is calculated according to (4.3). Notice that a valid intervention also requires ζ i ≤ T C .
To summarize, there are two cases: If no intervention takes place, the family must pay the insurance premium ι(I). If an intervention (ζ i , ω i ) takes place, an additional lump-sum payment becomes due
We allow the family to choose among insurance contracts with payouts specified by I (see equation (3.2)). The family is able to change its insurance exposures until the wage earner is 70 (T C = 50). The insurance contract expires at the age of 75 (T I = 55). These ages are typical for German term life insurance contracts.
We set the administrative fee (ψ ad = 2.99%) and the transaction fee (ψ tr = 5.05%) to the average values of the German life insurance market. 9 We discretize the conditional expec-
, 1, . . . , T C } using German mortality data. 10 For intermediate values of t we use linear interpolation.
Preferences We choose standard values from the life cycle portfolio optimization literature for the risk aversion (γ = 4), the time preference rate (δ = 0.03) and the bequest motive (ε = 1). In the benchmark calibration, the problem starts at time t = 0, when the wage earner is 20 years old, and ends at t = T = 80, when the wage earner is either 100 years old or dead.
Following Love (2010), we calculate the consumption equivalence scaling parameter via
where α Adult is the number of adults and α Child is the number of children in the household. In the benchmark calibration, we study a family consisting of two adults and one child. Hence, we set the corresponding consumption scaling parameter to φ 1,2 = 2.0043 if the wage earner is alive and to φ 3 = 1.4498 if the wage earner is dead. We assume that the family starts with a financial wealth level that is twice the initial annual labor income of the wage earner, X 0 = 2Y 0 .
Benchmark Results
This section provides our main results for the model introduced in Section 3 with the calibration presented in Section 4.
9 Data about the transaction fees and administrative fees on the German insurance market are taken from "map-report no. 807-808". 10 Mortality data is taken from Life table for Germany ("Sterbetafel 2009/11, Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013").
Average Key Variables over the Life Cycle
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] Figure 5 depicts the average optimal decisions as well as the average financial wealth and income over the life cycle. Similar as in the above mentioned papers, financial wealth is humpshaped and the portfolio holdings are decreasing over the life cycle. The dark consumption line represents the consumption of the whole family. We see that consumption increases over the life cycle, although the slope decreases significantly after retirement. This is mainly due to two reasons. First, the labor income profile changes at retirement, especially the certainty of the retirement income leads to a flatter consumption path. Second, due to a higher mortality risk at older ages there are more families where the wage earner has already died. Then, the family has no more income and one person less to take care of, which both reduces consumption.
The grey line represents the single person equivalent consumption. 11 This line increases almost linearly over the life cycle, which indicates that on average the death of the wage earner does not lead to a reduced utility from consumption for the remaining family members. This may be either due to a high amount of accumulated financial wealth, or a term life insurance contract.
As the insurance sum distribution graph shows, it is a combination of both for most families.
About 65% of the families buy a term life insurance over the life cycle. At a young age, the families stay away from the insurance market, but start buying insurance at the age of about 30. Furthermore, the families increase the insurance sums over the life cycle and there is no age at which they systematically reduce the insurance exposures. Apparently, agents do not change the insurance contracts after the retirement age of 65, although changes would be possible until the age of 70. This can be explained by the certainty of the retirement income. Consequently, there is no uncertainty with respect to human wealth. Hence, there is no reason to change the insurance decision. The increasing insurance sum over the life cycle might be counterintuitive at first. Since an older agent has on average more financial wealth and more income to hedge the effect of a health shock, one could expect the insurance demand to be lower compared to a 11 This is a comparable one-person consumption level that is calculated by weighting the consumption of the family with the consumption equivalence scaling parameter
situation with less income and wealth. However, there are opposing effects. First, for an older agent the contract duration is shorter. Hence, reducing an insurance exposure is relatively more costly than keeping it. Second, uncertainty with respect to human wealth and financial wealth significantly reduces for an older agent. Therefore, it is less likely that he faces a wealth and income state in which the contract is not affordable or too expensive relatively to his financial situation. These two effects dominate and yield an overall increasing insurance demand over the life cycle.
Comparative Statics

[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
To analyze the effects of age, income, financial wealth, and the previous insurance contract, we consider the policy functions. Figure 6 depicts the insurance demand for different levels of the labor income. The lines represent different ages for a fixed level of financial wealth and a fixed previous insurance contract with insurance sum 100 000. For all ages, the insurance demand increases in the income level, which has two reasons: First, if income is large, then a higher insurance sum becomes affordable. Second, since an insurance is a hedge against the income loss upon death of the wager earner, a higher income increases this hedging motive.
Furthermore, the figure highlights a time-dependence. The black line shows the policy function for a young wage earner at the age of 25. For a reasonable labor income of below 100 000, it is always optimal for the family to ignore any previous insurance contract and to not pay the premium. This leads to a loss of insurance protection and all previous paid premiums are lost as well. We document a large continuation interval ranging from about 175 000 to 450 000, i.e.
the family optimally sticks to the current insurance contract and no intervention takes place.
The advantage is that the insurance protection maintains, past premiums are not lost and no expensive lump-sum costs must be paid for increasing the insurance sum. For a 50 year old middle-aged agent it is in general optimal to stick to the previous insurance decision, except for very high or low labor income. So the insurance choice at this age is also very robust. For an old retired agent at the age of 68 the optimal insurance sum crucially depends on the pension level. Furthermore, the insurance sum increases due to the certainty of the pension. This means that income volatility as a crucial source of uncertainty is no longer present. Overall, we document a strong dependence of the optimal insurance demand on labor income and time.
The increasing insurance demand over time is in line with our previous findings.
[ INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE] Figure 7 depicts the corresponding policy functions dependent on financial wealth. Initially, we see that financial wealth has less impact on the insurance decision as income. However, this is not surprising, since the insurance is mainly used to hedge the loss of labor income in the case of death. Overall, the more financial wealth the agent has, the less insurance is optimal. This is intuitive, since with more wealth there is less need for a fixed payout in the case of death.
For a middle-aged agent the continuation region includes all reasonable financial wealth levels.
The young agent cancels the insurance if he has a huge amount of financial wealth (that is above the average wealth level at this age), whereas the old agent raises the insurance contract if he has less than 1 600 000 wealth. To summarize, the insurance decision is rather insensitive towards the level of financial wealth.
[INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE]
The policy functions dependent on the previous insurance decision in Figure 8 document the stickiness of this decision. The diagonal line depicts a situation where the agent keeps his insurance decision, i.e. the previous insurance contract equals the current optimal decision.
Below the diagonal, the agent reduces insurance protection, whereas he increases protection above the diagonal. A young agent would cancel any contract, independent of its insurance sum, and thus stays away from the insurance market in the first place. For him, the inflexibility of the contract is very severe, since he is tied to the contract for a potentially long time period or loses a significant amount of money if he cancels or reduces the contract prematurely. The uncertainty of human wealth at a young age amplifies this problem, as contracts are usually downward adjusted when human wealth has deteriorated and the current contract is not affordable any more. A middle-aged agent keeps a contract if the insurance sum is below 500 000. Contracts with higher insurance sum are reduced to this level. The old agent has a continuation region ranging from 200 000 to 750 000, where he sticks to his contract. To summarize, the decisions at every age are pretty stable: Young agents stay away from the insurance market, whereas middle-aged agents usually keep their current positions.
Impact of Critical Illness and Death Shocks
[INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE] Figure 9 depicts the effects of a critical illness shock at the age of 50 (black lines) and a death shock at the age of 60 (grey lines) on the optimal behavior and the financial wealth and income evolution. If the wage earner dies, financial wealth jumps upwards since the family receives an insurance payment. Furthermore, it leads to a negative jump in family consumption due to the reduced number of family members, although there is only a minor change in the level of single person equivalent consumption. However, the family reduces the slope of its consumption path to adjust to the new income situation. Besides, the portfolio holdings are reduced to the classical Merton demands, since there is no labor income any more.
If the agent is first exposed to a critical illness shock, he becomes aware of a high probability of an early death. Consumption is reduced since labor income decreases and the family tries to accumulate financial wealth for the remaining family members. Portfolio holdings are reduced as well. Unfortunately, the agent cannot increase his insurance protection any more. Therefore, at the time of death the average insurance sum is less than 50% of the sum of an agent without previous health shock. Finally, the single person equivalent consumption is adjusted when the health shock occurs, and thus there is no significant decrease at the time of death.
[INSERT FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE] Figure 10 illustrates a situation where the wage earner dies at the age of 30. In the first setting there is no previous health shock (grey lines), whereas in the second setting there is a health shock at the age of 25 (dark lines). In this case, the family has only little time to accumulate financial wealth. Furthermore, most families do not buy any insurance at this age, which explains the very low average insurance sum. These two facts together with the early death of the wage earner reduces consumption of the family and also the single person equivalent consumption significantly. Buying a term life insurance contract could easily double the available financial wealth.
Robustness Checks
This section presents robustness checks for different labor income volatility, different insurance fees, a calibration without health shock and for a changed family size. We also discuss the main drivers that prevent families from increasing their insurance demands. Furthermore, we
give results for a calibration with a social security system that pays a widow's pension after the death of the wage earner.
Labor Income Volatility
[INSERT FIGURE 11 ABOUT HERE]
A term insurance allows a family to (partially) hedge the risk resulting from an early death of the wage owner. Since the death of the wage earner predominately leads to a loss of labor income, the optimal insurance choice crucially depends on the labor income process. A negative feature of an insurance contract is the stickiness of its premia. Consequently, an insurance contract amplifies the effect of negative labor income shock. For instance, if a family is optimally insured and a negative labor income shock occurs, then the family has too much insurance protection given the actual income situation and must cut down on consumption. Alternatively, the family can reduce or terminate the insurance contract yielding to a loss, since term life insurance has no surrender value. In both cases, the effect of a negative labor income shock is stronger if the family has a higher insurance exposure. Therefore, hedging mortality risk comes at the cost of amplifying the effect of a negative labor income shock. In line with these findings, Figure 11 shows that the insurance demand is significantly higher for families with lower income volatility.
Besides, these families also buy insurance earlier so that young families are insured as well.
Insurance Structure
[INSERT FIGURE 12 ABOUT HERE]
The structure of a term life insurance contract varies among insurance companies. Especially the fees ψ tr , ψ ad , the date T C until the insurance decision can be revised and the expiration date T I can be different. Figure 12 depicts the effect of a change of the fees. We compare the average fees of the benchmark result (grey line) with a regime with high fees (light line) and without fees (dark line). Clearly, the insurance demand decreases if fees are raised. However, although the fees are increased significantly, the decrease in insurance demand is not dramatic.
This indicates that the insurance profit, captured by the fees, has a rather small impact on the insurance demand.
Health Shocks
[INSERT FIGURE 13 ABOUT HERE]
A health shock prevents the family from increasing the insurance protection or buying a new contract. Intuitively, one might expect that the family anticipates this restriction and buys more protection at an earlier age. Figure 13 compares the benchmark model with an alternative calibration without health shocks. Surprisingly, our findings document a higher insurance demand in the case without health shocks. The reason is that a health shock can be interpreted as a warning that death becomes more likely. If the wage earner faces a health shock, the family knows that he will die with a high probability in the next few years. Although an early death is clearly negative for the family, the health shock partially resolves uncertainty about the timing of dying, which itself is beneficial. With this new information the family is better able to plan consumption and investment decisions. Therefore, the family reduces consumption in order to accumulate more wealth, which can be seen in Figure 9 and 10. Due to the additional savings, the insurance demand goes down. Notice that in our benchmark calibration labor income is reduced after a health shock, which triggers a decrease in consumption. This is however also true in a calibration where the labor income is not reduced in the critical illness state. Furthermore, one might argue that the increased insurance demand without health shock results from the fact that in this setup there is no state in which the insurance acquisition is forbidden. However, the results also hold when we only consider families that do not face a health shock.
Family Size
[INSERT FIGURE 14 ABOUT HERE] Figure 14 confirms the intuition that a larger family buys more insurance protection. In our model, this is captured by the consumption scaling parameter φ A . The relative difference in the consumption scaling parameter in state A = 1, 2 and A = 3 is smaller, the larger the family.
Consequently, for a large family more consumption is needed to obtain the same single-person equivalent utility level. If the wage earner dies, the whole income is lost, but the bigger part of consumption remains if the family size is large. This increases the insurance demand.
Risk Aversion
[INSERT FIGURE 15 ABOUT HERE] Figure 15 shows the impact of the relative risk aversion on the average insurance sum. Apparently, risk aversion has little impact before the age of 30 and after retirement. In between, more risk averse agents demand less insurance. Hence, a more risk averse agent perceives the insurance contract as more risky compared to financial investments (stocks, bonds). However, overall the degree of relative risk aversion has only little impact on the insurance decision.
Social Security System
[INSERT FIGURE 16 ABOUT HERE]
In this paragraph, we add a social security system to the model that pays the family an income after the death of the wage earner. This can be interpreted as a widow's pension and the corresponding income stream is calibrated using data of the German social security system. Therefore, we recalibrate the effects of the wage earner's death on the income process as follows: Notice that at most a widow receives about 55% of the pension. Besides, before retirement (t < 45) there is also an adjustment for for the replacement rate of 0.68212 and deductions.
The income jump if the wage earner gets unhealthy p 1,2 remains unchanged. Figure 16 depicts the average key variables over the life cycle. Compared to an economy without social security system (see Figure 5 ), the average income is higher and does not approach zero.
Furthermore, the optimal consumption now shows a hump-shaped pattern. The financial wealth and the portfolio holdings are only little affected. The insurance sum distribution highlights that about 90% of the population buy term life insurance over the lifetime, which is a significant increase. However, one of our main results stands: Young families do not participate in term life insurance markets. Figure 17 compares the average insurance demand to the benchmark results without social security system. One might conjecture that a social security system crowds out most of the insurance demand and, consequently, the insurance demand is significantly reduced.
Our results however point in a different direction: With a social security system, the insurance demand significantly increases for all ages. This increase can be explained by the changes in characteristics of the income process. First, the human wealth is higher due to the additional payment. Second, human wealth uncertainty reduces since the income loss at death is less pronounced and the widow's pension is deterministic.
Conclusion
This paper studies the insurance demand of a family that is exposed to health shocks and mortality risk. The wage earner receives an unspanned income stream and can buy term life insurance up to the age of 70 as long as he is healthy. We model the available insurance contracts in a realistic way by assuming that they are of long-term nature and that decisions can only be revised at certain costs. The combination of unspanned income as well as the stickiness of the insurance contracts reduces the insurance demand significantly. In particular, young families do not participate in the insurance market at all.
Our results have potentially important policy implications. From a welfare perspective, one might argue that it is beneficial that people buy insurance contracts to avoid poverty. Our results document that long-term contracts prevent families from doing so, since they get locked into these contracts and have difficulties to pay premia if they are in financially dire situations.
This finding suggests that families should have access to more flexible insurance contracts. For instance, a contract with a variable insurance sum that is linked to the actual labor income evolution (similar to occupational pensions) could avoid the negative amplifying effect of a labor income shock. The mortality data (grey line) is gender averaged from a life table for Germany ("Sterbetafel 2009 /11, Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013 . Our simulated values (dark line) are the averages from 100 000 death shock simulations using the biometric risk calibration of Section 4. . c) shows the optimal average portfolio holdings over the life cycle. d) depicts the average income of the family. e) shows the average insurance sum. f) depicts the distribution of the insurance sum over the life cycle. The darkest area marks families with no insurance contract, the white area families with the highest insurance sum (2 000 000) and the grey areas families with intermediate insurance sums. evolution and average optimal controls based on 100 000 simulations where all wage earners are assumed to die at the age of 30. The black lines correspond to the optimal behavior of a family where the wage earner gets a critical illness at the age of 25, whereas the grey lines represent a family whose wage earner dies without previous critical illness. The calibration equals the one of the benchmark results and is explained in Section 4. a) shows the average financial wealth evolution over the life cycle. b) depicts the average optimal consumption over the life cycle. The solid lines are for the consumption of the family c and the dashed lines for the equivalent single person consumption level c φ . c) presents the average optimal portfolio holdings, d) gives the average income of the family and e) depicts the average optimal insurance sum over the life cycle. control variables as well as the average financial wealth and income evolution over the life cycle based on 100 000 simulations with a social security system as given in (6.5). The remaining calibration is described in Section 4. a) shows the average financial wealth evolution over the life cycle. b) depicts the average optimal consumption over the life cycle. The dark line corresponds to the consumption of the family, where the grey line represents the equivalent level of consumption for a one person household and is scaled with the consumption scaling parameter c φ . c) shows the optimal average portfolio holdings over the life cycle. d) depicts the average income of the family. e) shows the average insurance sum. f) depicts the distribution of the insurance sum over the life cycle. The darkest area marks families with no insurance contract, the white area families with the highest insurance sum (2 000 000) and the grey areas families with intermediate insurance sums. 
